Council for Global Problem-Solving
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Dennis Snower:
First of all, as we’ve just mentioned, two of us, Dennis Görlich and I, are both sitting in The New Institute in Hamburg. The New Institute is an institute for advanced studies that is combined with a platform for action. And as such, it will be cooperating with the Global Solutions Initiative in order to provide a place where people can meet virtually and possibly physically, in order to work out in greater depth what we want and possibly in the future provide various other forms of support, depending on exactly what needs arise, but it is a well-funded institute and I think the cooperation with Global Solutions looks very promising. The next thing that I wanted to mention was something that Dennis Görlich and I have been dreaming of for some time and it’s finally come true for us, which is: the G7 and the G20 are distinctive organisations, but they have a potentially complimentary role to play with one another. And in the spirit of multilateralism, it would be good to be able to advise both the G20 and the G7. Next year, the first half of next year, Germany has the presidency of the G7 and the German Chancellery has asked Global Solutions together with the DIE to be the leaders of the T7. And therefore this is a whole new opportunity, and we are hoping to do something similar for the G7 as we did for the G20. That is, to introduce some sort of regular professional organization, that we divide the work into task forces that produce policy briefs that are focused on the priorities of the G7. And to keep in mind the potential complementarities between the two. And on that account, I think everybody in the Council for Global Problem Solving will probably have a few lights that have lit up with this news and we would love to draw on your expertise in order to proceed further. The last thing that I wanted to say is that there is a Working Group on measurement of prosperity beyond GDP beyond shareholder value that Global Solutions has initiated. And that is going well, there will be a formal workshop on this held virtually next
week. And there will be a report that is submitted to the G20 in line with what we have recommended that the G20 should regularly measure the performance of nations, not just with regard to GDP, but also in accordance with certain environmental and social criteria. And we have a working group that the major players are all involved in this contributing to this common effort. And then finally, there is going to be a series of workshops on economic paradigm change, dealing with the question “how does our economic paradigm have to change in order to be able to make good use of new ways of measuring to think beyond shareholder value and to create a world that is more recoupled than the one that we have?” So if you’re interested in any of that, get in touch with Katharina and me. So the measurement working group and the paradigm change working group is something that’s happening. And with regard to the T7, you’ll hear from us presently. Good, Katharina, you introduce.

Katharina Lima de Miranda:
Okay, thank you, Dennis, for this general introduction and we are here today for our distinguished speakers. We have Jose from CARI, Akshay from ORF and Franco Bruni. And we will hear about the policy briefs and taking stock of the world within the T20 Italy Taskforce on International Finance and current developments at the G20 level. All of you have served as co-chairs of the T20 Taskforce on International Financial Architecture not only this year, but in several years in the past, so are very familiar with everything. And I think this workshop comes in quite timely as last week the T20 Italy has completed yet another great milestone with the handing over of the final communiqué to the G20 Italian presidency during the T20 Summit, which I have heard was quite a success. I couldn’t attend in person, but I think over 800 people were actually there in person and many, many more virtually, and an impressive lineup of speakers and of course, recommendations also on this topic. And then tomorrow, the G20 finance ministers and central bank governors are gathering in Washington, in the margins of the International Monetary Fund. So a lot of things in progress at the moment and the T20 has submitted to Italy’s G20 presidency, among others a statement on international finance and in the statement, the taskforce calls upon the G20 economy and finance ministers for renewed commitment to address the challenges of avoiding moving from the COVID induced economic crisis to a new financial crisis. Just somehow worrisome if this would be coming up. The recommendations include that the policies should be designed and swiftly implemented, aiming at supporting countries to ensure debt sustainability, get ready for the digital money revolution, consider climate induced risks, monitor central bank’s activities and ensure transparency in capital flows, especially when it comes to activities by state owned multinational enterprises. And we will dig into at least two of these topics more closely now and then get an overview at the end. So we’ll start with Jose. Jose Siaba Serrate, you are a member of the Argentine Council of Foreign Relations CARI and also Senior Associate Research Fellow at ISPI. And I very much look forward to your presentation of the policy brief that you’ve written with Claude Lopez from the Milken Institute on digital monies and the need to prepare the financial system for the digital.

Jose Siaba Serrate:
Okay, thank you, Katerina. Thank you, Dennis, everyone for being there. I will be brief. I would start by saying that we are talking about digital money and finance. The main reason is that we will stop talking about digital money and we will talk about money in the future and digital will be just one aspect of it. Now we are in an early phase of development. So we will pay a lot of attention to change and digitalization in these fields as the digital revolution you mentioned is a very wild concept affecting the whole of society. I would like to start with an old phrase written by Hyman Minsky in 1986 saying that everyone can create money. The problem is just to get it accepted. And digital money and digital means of payments are testing that statement. I will start saying that cryptocurrencies are not true currencies just for the beginning. Even if Bitcoin is presented as a peer to peer version of electronic money, but it is more useful, I would say, as an asset than as a true currency. And as such it was dismissed originally by central banks and authorities as a kind of eccentricity but not as a real challenge. But those were the original cryptocurrencies, Bitcoin the most relevant. But after Bitcoin and other developments occurred and stable coins designed to preserve or to be linked with a stable value relative to other assets, mainly other currencies, they are as an evolution better suited for exchange. And you might think that global stable coins might become global currencies. I would add that ironically 99% of the transactions of decentralized cryptocurrencies nowadays are done in centralized exchanges. So, they present a challenge, but they are not functioning like true currencies. But when in June 2019, Facebook launched its Libra project, that was the project, I think that finally caught the eye of central bankers and people involved with these matters. Because you might think that giant platforms like Amazon, Google, the Chinese ones, Facebook, could well develop their own digital currencies as a natural extension of their businesses. And they might use those currencies, tied with the multiple data, trade and social services they provide. And they might favor massive customer adoption, because it would be very, very convenient. Facebook already boasts that it has almost 40% or half the world’s population as customers, the real number might be a little bit less than that. But that’s a very impressive consumer base. And if you add just the alternative of paying for whatever you’re searching, or dealing with, within Facebook, without having to get out of Facebook, to pay for a service or a good, it’s quite clear that many of those customers would choose that option. That’s why Libra, the original project never flew, it was stopped by regulators. But I think that Facebook, in launching this system alerted the whole world that even though Bitcoin was an eccentric move, finally, in just, I would say a few years, you have a different design, based upon that original idea, and that different design could well become a global currency on its own, and that might have changed the world. So I would say that financial risks are a major concern. And central banks have reacted mainly, in my view, because they do not want to destabilize the entire monetary system that exists for many centuries now. So you have a central bank, at the center of the system, and a lot of commercial private sector owned banks that clear payments, the operations and in that sense money, nowadays, is a public-private partnership. That works well, I would say. But that now faces competition through other financial architectures. You might have decentralized peer to peer networks that can replace this two-tier system. Or you might have big economic platforms that might do the same without using, in either case, the current system. And I think the reaction from central banks, their interest is based in knowing that and having to keep the money relevant for the future, which is their task. And it’s not only conventional money that has to show
that it might be fit for the future. But I would say it’s largely every aspect of the financial system: legacy banks, infrastructure and regulation, financial and monetary policies, that might be affected by change. And you better be early, premature, than late. You might be wrong in reacting so early, but that’s a small price you should opt to pay because you do not want to be wrong and late and react when this digital alternative system grows. We know that capital markets are path-dependent. So, in that sense, it’s better that you participate, have a voice, or can set a course early in the process. I would say that central bank digital currencies emerge as a consequence of these cross-currents. I would say they are basically a contingency plan, they are something central banks are considering not because they are very enthusiastic about these developments, but because they know that this process might grow and challenge the role central banks have nowadays. The usage of conventional cash which in some societies is became in a very fast way. But in no way I would suggest that conventional cash will not be here in the for the long future as books stay and many other conventional items remain relevant. But you have to be prepared in case digital innovations and other types of innovations change the world in a way that the public considers these new types of monies more convenient. And even though you can control this process just by regulating it, by prohibiting the innovations you think involve a huge financial stability risks, in the long term, central banks have a duty and the duty is to provide the public with the means of payments and the system that the public consider more convenient and indeed in this sense, that might not be well served or only served by conventional monies. The Chinese central bank has been one of the pioneers in this field. It has started considering versions of electronic and digital monies very early I would say it has started in 2014. It has made huge advances, a lot of patents, in the central bank they have a digital monetary institution which employs almost 1000 people and they have launched their own pilot of a central bank currency as early as in April 2020. We just have only two central bank digital currencies in operations. Now, both issued by small central banks in the Caribbean, the first one was sand dollar and that stresses other aspect that for some countries with very specific characteristics, central bank digital currencies can become a very useful tool. So we I think we are in the middle of a revolution. I would compare this revolution to Napster revolution in the music industry. And I think central banks do not want to make the same mistakes that the music industry committed when Napster erupted. You’d better be a participant of this process, try to follow this process, understand it and respond to it. Even if you find that for example, in the music industry Napster had a lot of weaknesses, but Napster transformed the whole industry. It is no longer here, it was just process and a model viable for quite few years, but it changed completely the way music is distributed and the way you sell it and the way you live with this business making profits. So, in that sense, I think CBDCs or central bank digital currencies are a contingency plan. Central banks would like not to make a decision yet, but they have to be able to evaluate the future. And I think they will consider issuing it later in the future. One of the main reasons is that the current competitive systems are very prone to failure and failure is not an option. We are speaking on these terms from a public sector perspective. Our specific proposal in this process is very synthetic, I would say. We urge G20 leaders to develop a vision on money, payments, and finance and the digital aspect of them, to monitor them, to integrate that vision into their agenda to guide the financial system through this transition towards the digital age. I think they should encourage the broadest international cooperation, there are a lot of aspects tied to
increased currency competition in the international arena in the future. So that would make central banks eager to cooperate, in my impression. I think we have reached a stage where not only finance but other fields need strong global digital governance compact or framework. And in order to guide I would say a responsible and inclusive digital economy. And within this compact a financial chapter should be developed in order to calibrate the financial agenda accordingly. Big economic platforms, like Amazon and Facebook operate in various different financial and non-financial activities and domains. And you need that to be ordered, to have some principles, codes of conduct, regulation, etc. That’s needed not only for finance, but finance will need it in order to integrate a working or well-functioning financial agenda.

**Dennis Snower:**
Jose I just want to say we’ve overshot the 10 minutes.

**Jose Siaba Serrate:**
I would say the proposal supports the execution of the G20 roadmap for cross-border transactions, which is some low-hanging fruit that you can achieve relatively easily and in short term. I think it’s the same for the Global Partnership for Financial Inclusion, and the G20 Financial Inclusion Action Plan that works in the same direction. So if we are in the 10 minutes that will be it.

**Katharina Lima de Miranda:**
Thank you so much, Jose. I really like the Napster allegory so I think the younger ones among us don’t even know Napster anymore, but know how we consume music today. And it’s very, very different than before.

**Jose Siaba Serrate:**
Napster was against the law since you have a first view on Napster. But just stressing that was not enough. And it was one of the mistakes of the of the industry. They want all the lawsuits. But the industry changed the way the world will function, mainly because consumers change and this is the new part, the new mobile part of the equation. The consumer has gained an edge in a world where you thought that just supply was defining what demand will take. And even if nowadays, you think central banks still have that relevant position, if you just think about the next 5-10 years, you will realize you really don’t know where there will be going. So you better be involved there and better be flexible in order to understand that you can, in the short term, solve all the problems just by regulating them. But in the long term, as things change, you might be over regulated, or you might be destroying welfare.

**Katharina Lima de Miranda:**
Let’s see how it will evolve, and whether central banks and governments are able to react in a responsible, forward-looking way. Thank you very much. Let’s turn Akshay Mathur, Director of the Observer Research Foundation at Mumbai now, and head of the Geo-economic Studies Program across
all ORF centers. And I’ve learned today that you’re also a Fellow of CIGI in Canada. Very nice. So you’ll tell us about regulating state-owned multinational enterprises.

Akshay Mathur:
I have a slide deck, which I will just use as an aid to convey the concept paper that I’ve written. I want to say two or three things. One is that, of course, coming after Jose who is looking at digital monies and it’s something so futuristic, I’m going to take you back like 30 years to start talking about state owned enterprises. But I think I do it in the spirit of providing like a thought paper. Because this idea originally came during a discussion I was having with some government officials, on what state owned multinational enterprises mean today, and I was trying to discuss the impact of state owned multinational enterprises to the world economy. And, and so I think the idea here is to provide at least a conceptual suggestion on how they can be regulated. So what I’ll do is, let me just start to share my screen. Can you see this okay? Okay. So there are not too many slides, they’re about six or seven slides. So let me just explain the concept. I think everybody understands the importance of state owned enterprises and the contribution they have made, the assets they have in the global economy today. They also have the largest debts. And as we know, with all the issues with debt, and how governments are under stress, it becomes all the more reason to look at state. In particular, I think there’s been a lot of discussion about state owned enterprises, but less about state owned multinational enterprises. And this was something that was interesting to me, because while there was so much discussion on state, you know, systemically important financial institutions, we did not discuss data on multinational enterprises at that time, because the focus was so much on the financial sector, but not on other kinds of enterprises that have a large bearing on the economy. So in short, if I’m talking about a global framework for regulating SOMNEs what would that be? There are four elements to that. One is defining what constitutes a state owned multinational enterprise, clearly. A second was enforcing transparency and ownership of business – who owns the state owned enterprises and what they do, mapping cross border financial interlinkages and of course, some kind of a regular mechanism to see and do some kind of stress testing to see if they’re actually financially stable. Of course, a good starting point is SOEs and the SOEs that exist today in the world, it’s not just in developing economies. I know that, of course, China has 150,000 SOEs and so that the Chinese SOEs are most popularly discussed in mainstream scholarship and media. But SOEs exist in European countries as some of you know, and also exists in India and in Southeast Asia. So SOEs exist around the world, it’s just that we need to look at state owned multinational enterprises. There are existing definitions for what state owned multinational enterprises is: TPP tried to take a stab at least defining an SOE. So if you look at how TPP defines it they look at, does the government actually support it? Do they own 50% of the share? Is a controlling ownership? Do they have members of the board? Similarly, IMF has a definition for public corporation. And the list as you can see a series of bullet points: appointment of key personnel, golden shares, changes regulation. Both TPP and IMF actually have a definition. The World Bank also has a definition for public sector unit because it’s required. So they define use of central government, or a political subdivision, central banks and even if they are autonomous institutions, both financial and non-financial corporations, then, depending on whose mandate the fall in, whether there is more than 50%,
government share, who’s in charge of debt? World Bank has a definition for public sector. Now, of course, IMF and World Bank you can imagine, would need a definition because there’s so much engagement with the government and they need to have certain disclosures, they need assessments of the different countries and what is happening with SOEs. What I’m proposing here is that a definition for state owned multinational enterprises needs to be something slightly different. It can build on the existing definitions, of course. So here are two ideas. For instance, one, we can add the share of revenue earned from foreign operations. Because multinational enterprises are distinct because of their foreign operations, something that identifies their foreign operations would be helpful. Now, this can be both revenue earned, or we could try and look at the asset and liability side. So on the definition side, we need to provide some kind of a uniform definition. If you go into disclosures, there is a lot of work happening on SOEs, on what kind of disclosures they should have. Now a lot of work is happening in disclosures at the G20, at the IMF, at the World Bank, multinational enterprises, at G7. Most of the work on disclosures today is focused more or less on two issues. On one hand, there are guidelines on better corporate governance. So there are rules and regulations around corruption, around firm level resilience, around disclosure of information to their respective governments and to multilateral entities so corporate governance is important. Primarily because there’s always a concern, whether the SOEs themselves are financially resilient or not. The second category or second box under which most of the guidelines currently fall into are those related to financial institutions. These are the ones that came after the transatlantic financial crisis. So all the guidelines that came from SIFIs, the guidelines that came from FSB, IMF, on disclosure and peer to peer assessment process, etc. So those are the two categories in which the disclosures typically happen for SOEs today, or even SOMEs today. 00:33:52

Katharina Lima de Miranda:
Akshay, we still see the first slide, have you switched the slide?

Franco Bruni:
We are losing your face, which is a pity, and we are not gaining very much.

Akshay Mathur:
Is it? I’m so sorry. Well the slides are not as pretty as my face, but you should be able to see the slides nevertheless.

Katharina Lima de Miranda:
Now we do see the context slide.

Akshay Mathur:
Oh, I’m so sorry. I don’t want to repeat, but what I’ll do is I just entered the slides again, because I don’t want to repeat the content. So I was just giving the context for SOMEs here. And what are the four elements – as you can see in the bottom of the screen – that are required for creating a global framework for SOMEs. The next slide, I was trying to convey that a good starting point is of course,
what we have for state owned enterprises today. And the state owned enterprises are not just new to
developing economies of China, but they’re spread across the world. The next slide was around the
definitions and that TPP is the most current which at least tries to take a stab at what an SOE is. But of
course, you can see at the bottom half IMF has an existing definition for a public corporation. And
there’s a there’s a slew of parameters by which IMF defines what a public corporation is. So public
corporation can be a shorthand for SOEs here, at least in this context, the discussion today. Same thing
with World Bank. World Bank also has of course certain parameters by which they define SOEs, more
or less similar to trying to identify the parameters: if there’s government control, is there government
mandated directors on the board, are they part of a government division etc. And so there are
definitions that exist for an SOE and my proposal here was that perhaps we can build on the SOE
definition, to provide a definition for state owned multinational enterprises. And two things that we can
consider there is perhaps adding a share of revenue learn from foreign operations, because of course,
if they’re multinational, we want to understand what level of international engagement they have. So
it’s either could be from their income statement, or from their asset liability statement. So these were
the two ideas. And then I moved on to a second part. So the first part there were four elements, I said,
The first one was about defining the SOMEs. The second one is about disclosure. And what I was trying
to convey here was that there are lots of disclosure initiatives around the world, but they pretty much
fall into two buckets, if I were to take a reductionist approach. One kind of guidelines fall into corporate
governance: the firms there should be no antics, there should not be any corruption, there should be
one arm distance between all the contracts, etc. But the other one are a slew of regulations that were
introduced after the transatlantic financial crisis 2008 on SIFIs by the Financial Stability Board and the
IMF. So that’s another bucket. The point I was trying to convey was, and this is my proposal on
disclosures is that I think disclosure for state owned multinational enterprises should include elements
like, what is a foreign currency denominated debt? Or can we actually have disclosure of credit given or
taken by state owned multinational enterprises, because it plays such a systemic role in the world
economy? So I think you’re caught up now. But I will continue with the same pace. The third idea was
then: Okay, if we’ve defined it, and we have an idea of what we want to use for disclosures, how can we
map the interlinkages, the global interlinkages? And, you know, the legal entity identifier – beneficial
ownership – is really a very fundamental concept is emerging in international financial architecture
today. And this is like a unique ID system, all the benefits that we’ve always known about unique IDs, I
come back even in this proposal to come and depend on LEIs because it is a G20 mandated identifier
that was introduced after the trans – I think that it can be used in many other things. And one way is to
force the state owned multinational enterprises to use LEIs in all their international transactions,
because that will help us track what level of international engagement these institutions have. So that
was just a way to indicate the kind of work that can go into defining a state owned multinational
enterprise or at least creating the a global framework for state owned multinational practice. I want to
just end with this statement saying that I understand that this is a conceptual note, and it doesn’t have
an action plan. But nevertheless, I thought that under the mandate of the G20 or the T20 in our case,
part of our responsibility is also providing like conceptual solutions to some of the IFA related issues in
this taskforce. So hence, this submission. I know that there is interest in it in India, not because of SOEs
in India, because a lot of the SOEs in India are actually already listed publicly. And if they’re not listed publicly, then they have a government mandate, where they can actually declare any information that you ask with the Right to Information Act, it’s a law. But certainly, you know, it may not come as a surprise to all of you that India is competing with China and a lot of areas. And so therefore, it’s finding it hard to compete in a marketplace in a transparent marketplace. The Indian public sector enterprises – which, it’s another name for SOEs – the Indian SOEs are not being able to compete in an open marketplace. And so definitely, there’s interest in finding out if there’s a way to create a global framework for all state owned multinational enterprises. I’ll stop here thanks.

Katharina Lima de Miranda:
Thank you so much Akshay. Now please, we just switch over to Franco who is the lead Co-chair of this year’s taskforce and can tell us everything about his takeaways and outlook.

Franco Bruni:
Thank you, I’ll try to be as brief as possible. Well, Jose and Akshay I have contributed some of the most interesting policy briefs in the in our task force, where I acted as a co-chair. Digital money, which is Jose’s team, were since the beginning a crucial chapter of our agenda, while the multinational state owned enterprises were a specific topic suggested by Akshay as belonging to the traditional flow of research in the task forces of international financial architecture of the last several years, namely the topic of transparency and anti-corruption in international capital markets. And Akshay himself has been contributing in the past T20s some briefs. The agenda of this year’s taskforce included various other teams, like proposals to reform central bank strategies, and to cope with new sources of financial instability like climate change or artificial intelligence. We have also covered the issue of normalization of macroeconomic policies that have been very expansionary for many years now with the rapid acceleration during the pandemic, with enormous increases in public debt and the emergence of risks of excessive inflation, and perhaps even the worst form of inflation which is stagflation. Some normalization must therefore take place, but the G20 should be careful in having its path cautious, the path of normalization, and characterized by an intense international coordination, as well as by conveniently arranged and transparent announcements in such a way as to avoid frightening the markets and increasing uncertainty. Having said that, various other issues have been considered in our taskforce proposals and I would like to stress that special attention has been devoted to one problem and where the majority of our policy briefs have been concentrating, about 7 out of 15. And this is the key problem of the debt problem of developing economies, which is probably the key issue also for the political discussion of the G20 this year. A crucial point in this field is to go beyond the what has already been obtained by the G20, both in 2020 and 2021, namely the suspension of the debt service of approximately 70 poorest countries in the world. The 70 poorest countries of the world have been allowed to postpone the service of their debts and the second achievement has been a creation of a very large amount of new special drawing rights by the IMF. As for the debt of the poorest countries, we need to move towards restructuring or canceling large amounts of their debts, it’s insufficient simply to suspend the debt service. On the SDR front the problem is to make sure that those that are acquired by
the G20 countries will be made available for less developed ones. I mean, when you create SDRs, you create them in proportion to the ownership of the of the IMF. So Germany will get a lot of SDRs but the idea is that Germany’s SDR should be channeled to help less developed countries. Moreover, the debt problem is not limited to the poorest countries, as it extends to several emerging economies which have not been considered up to now in these measures. They should also be helped out of very precarious financial situations. Obviously, we aren’t talking of pure generosity, financial solidarity on these fronts serves the purpose of global financial stability, which is in the interest of every country, as well as of the resumption of a sustainable growth trend in the world’s economy. If I have time, I can list very quickly a few specific proposals on this front of debt, that have been illustrated and detailed in our policy brief. To develop a new multilateral swap mechanism scaling up the capacity of the networks already in operation. There are a lot of networks now, helping central banks to help each other in confronting financial and monetary shocks. This has to be sort of reorganized and centralized under the supervision of the IMF in a much more integrated form. We also suggest to reform the IMF access limits and surcharge policy to support the recovery of middle income countries. We insist that the IMF should exclude completely any procyclical policy advice, which is sometimes given to countries in difficulty to go towards more austerity when you need instead the opposite. We propose the creation of a world recovery fund – sort of a new institution – to allow emerging economies to swap existing debt for new debt – so start restructuring – in an incentive compatible way, and issue new debt under improve market conditions, with an underlying project as collateral. This is an interesting elaboration, the idea is to connect the restructuring to a project and the project could be aimed at favoring investment in sustainable ecological oriented form. Finally, another proposal that has been detailed in one of our policy briefs, and we hope that in one way or another will be taken into consideration, is a possible legal air cover to temporarily protect countries against lawsuits. When a country cannot repay or service its debt and goes to default there are a series of lawsuits that can complicate enormously the managing a situation. The idea is to have a sort of a legal air cover, and this can be obtained in various ways that are analyzed by our authors. One way is to issue a United Nations Security Council immunity shield that can be done under centralized deliberation by the United Nations. An alternative though could be an executive order by the US president and a similar legislative action by the UK Parliament, given that the majority of the securities issued by highly indebted countries are in New York or London so these measures could take care of practically the whole problem. Well, this is a very short list and I’m finished.

Katharina Lima de Miranda:
Okay, since we have only seven minutes left maybe we can also have a short outlook. What are the topics that will continue? What will be important over the upcoming years? Do you have a view on that or do the others want to jump in?

Dennis Snower:
Could I just say, this last account was absolutely breathtaking. And we will all have an incentive, if we haven’t done so already to look very carefully over the policy briefs because these proposals look really
promising and would be something that should be taken into account in subsequent presidencies. Also, with regard to the other two, I just find this was an extraordinarily insightful session here. Jose your overview of digital currencies and Akshay of the state owned multinational enterprise, providing background for how to measure that. Extremely important issues, therefore I just had to give expression to the degree to which I was impressed by the standard set today. Sorry, before returning that was a little outburst and I just want to say that I’ll have to leave exactly in five minutes on the hour. But don’t consider this any sort of editorial valuation on my part, it’s just another schedule. Yes, as Katarina said, let’s have the discussion.

Franco Bruni:
If I can say you know, just want to, I think that each and every of our topics we hope will have a development also in the future G20. And this is one sentence. The second sentence is that, in spite of this, T20 should sort of try to concentrate its contributions in a much more focused and narrow way. So less proposals, much more elaborated and ready to be delivered in an operational way to the G20. I mean, those two things are in contradiction in a way, obviously, but as German philosophers have taught us, contradictions are fruitful. So we hope to be able to help Indonesians and Indians to go in both directions, in a way, keep taking care of everything, and in the other way, just write a couple of briefs. But very, very, very ready to be used, so to speak.

Katharina Lima de Miranda:
Akshay?

Akshay Mathur:
Well, you know, our philosophers don’t say anything about contradictions. They talk about argumentation. And so we’re known as argumentative Indians for a reason. So we may not be as productive as you want but we hope we will be. As you’ve all, Franco, first of all, just congratulations again, on leading the task force, as well as for your T20. I know, we’ll get a chance to express more gratitude again, hopefully, in the days to come. I want to give maybe three or four updates, as you can imagine, it’s very, very early days for us to think about the G20. But nevertheless, this is a small group. And this is a group that is always concerned itself with G20. So I’ll give a few updates. And then I also have a hard stop in three minutes. But for what it’s worth, what I’m observing already is likely going to guide India’s G20 engagement in the next two years. I have four points. So the first is that we’re already India’s a chair and has been the chair of the G20 Framework Working Group since inception, from 2009. So I think that’s a very important deliverable and India’s been co-chairing it, and the Framework Working Group is going to guide a lot of the G20 goals that we set. We’re also the chair of the G20 Anti-corruption Working Group this year. So some of that is coming through already. Number two, the second thing that’s going to guide – and we’re seeing this already – is the presidency of multilateral processes that we have taken on already so we were the chair of the BRICS presidency this year. We also had for one month the presidency of the United Nations Security Council. And so those are very important indicators for India’s G20 presidency going forward, the BRICS presidency and I was a
Sherpa for the academic track of the BRICS presidency. So I know the kind of work that went in this year. Boy, it was a lot of work. But there was there a lot of concepts that came out of it. And I think that would be a good indicator for you all to track if you’re interested. A third one has to do with secretariat and infrastructure. The infrastructure is already being built out. I mean, in fact, it’s massive. You know, even the best of countries require infrastructure for hosting something like this, probably not as much as if—I mean, Italy is very well suited, I know. But we are not for hosting 20 heads of state plus 20. So infrastructure is in place, but a secretariat, at least the beginnings of the secretariat are already in place, they have a plan, they have a building, they have people already in that building. So I think that’s good news. And my last point, final point is that there are also lots of research grants coming our way. So that’s good news. In fact, at this point, I have more than I can handle, because I don’t have enough people to actually work on some of the work that has been assigned. But I think that’s probably a natural rite of passage for anybody who goes through this process. So we do have Indonesia before us. And we are already planning to do a meeting with Indonesia in November. So I’ll just stop there.

Dennis Snower:
Can I just say I have to leave. But this was an extremely impressive round. I’d like to thank each and every one of you, this was absolutely amazing. I look forward to remaining in touch, because these are topics, as Franco said, that will continue to follow us in the coming years. So sorry that I have to leave, take care, all the best.

Katharina Lima de Miranda:
Bye Dennis, thank you so much Akshay also for sharing these organizational news for the G20 in India I think this is very helpful. We should remain in touch and exchange information and ideas on what we can do, how we can accompany the process, what are the topics that we can feed in with this group. So I think it’s very helpful to have these, even though it’s a small group, we can have important exchanges here. So thank you very much for coming, for participating.