

Task Force 4: Global Peace and Security

The G7's Contribution to Maritime Security in the Indo-Pacific

Lead Author:

Francesca Maremonti

Co-Authors:

Riccardo Alcaro

Aurelio Insisa

Key Points

- The Indo-Pacific region is subjected to ongoing strategic transformations involving the security sphere. The potential disruption of vital sea lines and critical supply chains warrant greater cooperation on maritime security.
- Group of Seven (G7) countries have recently ramped up their military engagement in the Indo-Pacific and cooperation with regional partners, released Indo-Pacific strategies and launched initiatives to enhance maritime security as well as resilience of supply chains and critical infrastructures.
- The G7 should scale up its effort to maximise existing bilateral and multilateral initiatives with such key regional actors as India, Japan and Australia. To strengthen the security architecture of the maritime domain, the G7 should establish a multilateral Maritime Security Dialogue for the Indo-Pacific. The platform should address key strategic challenges such as threats to freedom of navigation, and disruption of supply chain and critical infrastructures.

Overview

The geopolitical shocks of recent years - including Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the re-emergence of conflict and instability in the Middle East, China's apparent determination to forcefully unify Taiwan to the mainland – have exposed the intertwinement between traditional security and economic security, as well as an increasing interconnection between the Euro-Atlantic, Middle Eastern and Indo-Pacific theatres.

The sanctions imposed by the G7 and the European Union (EU) on Russia following its aggression against Ukraine have impacted export trajectories of energy and food and the configuration of global supply chains. The attacks conducted since November 2023 on commercial ships transiting the Red Sea by the Houthis - a group that controls northern Yemen - have forced companies to re-direct trade routes to the south of Africa, at much greater costs. Between December 2023 and February 2024, container shipping through the Red Sea declined by approximately 90% while shipping costs rose by 1000% for some companies, exposing the crucial ramifications of maritime security (Defense Intelligence Agency 2024). Policymakers around the world, including in G7 countries, have increasingly recognised the need to promote maritime security to secure vital trade routes, avoid disruptions and chokepoints of supply chains and maintain regional and, more broadly, global stability.

These concerns have further cemented the position of the Indo-Pacific region - a macro-area roughly extending from East Asia and the Pacific to Oceania and Southern Asia - as the world's geoeconomic centre of gravity. The region accounts for approximately two-thirds of the global population, 60% of global GDP (US Department of State 2022)ⁱ and roughly two-

thirds of maritime trade and global economic growth, while being home to five nuclear powers (India, Pakistan, China and North Korea as well as the United States) (Abbondanza and Wilkins 2024).ⁱⁱ Its interconnection with other theatres has also elevated the importance of other spaces, such as the Arctic, poised to be a strategic maritime military and route between the Euro-Atlantic and the Indo-Pacific region.

It is no surprise that G7 countries have been working on national Indo-Pacific strategies. The Japanese government paved the way in 2016, introducing in its National Security Strategy the concept of “Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP)”, envisioned as a basin safe for trade and cooperation, governed by partnerships and rules-based regimes (The Government of Japan 2016).ⁱⁱⁱ The other G7 countries followed suit. The United States developed its own concept for an Indo-Pacific already in 2018. In 2019 France adopted its Indo-Pacific strategy and the United Kingdom (UK) announced its Indo-Pacific ‘Tilt’, which was upgraded in the so-called Refresh of 2023 (HM Government 2023).^{iv} In 2020 Germany released its Indo-Pacific ‘guidelines’. In 2021 the EU launched its own Indo-Pacific Strategy, with a strong emphasis on the promotion of rules-based multilateral regimes (European Union External Action 2024).^v The following year Canada came out with its own national strategy (Government of Canada n.d.).^{vi} While it did not release a specific strategy, Italy developed the notion of an “enlarged Mediterranean” that extends to the Arabian Peninsula, East Africa and the Indian Ocean as an area of main national interest (Goretti and Simonelli 2024).^{vii} While all documents presented national specificities, G7 countries built their Indo-Pacific postures on the pillars of security, economy and partnerships. Maritime security cuts across these three strategic dimensions.

Challenges to a “free, open and secure” Indo-Pacific

Over the years, G7 leaders have repeatedly committed to a “free, open and secure Indo-Pacific”, lastly during a Foreign Ministers meeting on the margins of the Munich Security Conference in February 2025 (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2025).^{viii} The Indo-Pacific is indeed fraught with security challenges. The first and most pressing one is the deterioration of relations between China and Taiwan and the possibility of a Chinese attempt to force the island’s unification to the mainland. The second are the continuing tensions in the Korean peninsula, since North Korea has abandoned its long-standing position in favour of re-unification and labelled South Korea an enemy, while continuing to expand its ballistic and nuclear programs. Growing political alignment between China, Russia and North Korea have resulted in closer military cooperation and, more broadly, in the Indo-Pacific encroaching on European security, as Chinese and North Korean support has been critical to Russia’s war effort in Ukraine. With regard to the maritime dimension, in 2024 Chinese and Russian militaries conducted a joint aerial patrol over the Sea of Japan for the first time (ul Khali),^{ix} while China has provided moorage for a US-sanctioned Russian cargo ship implicated in

North Korean arms transfers to Russia (Martina and Brunnstrom 2024),^x on track with previous involvement in the evasion of Western sanctions (Mallory 2021).^{xi} China has also played a crucial role in sustaining the Iranian economy with oil imports since the United States unilaterally abandoned the nuclear deal with Iran in 2018 (Tomer and Raz 2024).^{xii}

Several other obstacles hinder a “free and open” maritime domain, to the detriment of economic security. With two-thirds of total global trade by volume transiting it, the Indo-Pacific is traversed by critical supply chains, including those for semiconductors and critical raw materials as well as for strategic sectors for global economy such as electric vehicles (EVs) (Panda 2023).^{xiii} The region is home to semiconductors’ key industry players, with companies from Taiwan, China, Japan and South Korea generating more sales than any other region (Statista 2024).^{xiv} The US and EU strategies to reduce over-concentration on a single supplier, namely China, have contributed to a reconfiguration of supply chains in the region. Several Indo-Pacific countries, such as Thailand for the EV sector, have emerged as new industrial hubs with the potential to be an alternative to China (Statista 2024).^{xv}

The Indo-Pacific region has one of the world’s greatest concentrations of information and communication technology (ICT) submarine cables, the backbone of digital connectivity where 99% of Internet traffic passes through (Bellabarba 2024).^{xvi} Such digital infrastructures are exposed to damage, whether caused by fishing incidents or deliberate attacks. Since 2017, the cables off the Matsu Islands— an archipelago under Taiwan’s administration – have been disrupted over thirty times, with at least a third of those disruptions attributable to Chinese vessels (Tomaz and Voo 2024).^{xvii}

The Indo-Pacific hosts a number of potential chokepoints in sea lines of communication (SLOC) that underpin global stability. The South China Sea (SCS) is exposed to the sovereignty tensions between China and other coastal states supported by the United States. Disruptions of freedom of navigation in the SCS would cut off this artery of global trade, where about US\$5 trillion in annual trade passes.^{xviii} The weaponization of this waterway poses a threat to regional stability, with ramifications potentially unfolding at a global scale. The Strait of Malacca - the most important sea line in the world connecting the Indian Ocean to the Pacific - sees almost half of the global maritime trade and a third of global crude oil trade passing through this route, making it vital for oil-hungry countries like China (Weekes 2023).^{xix} India’s naval dominance over the Strait is a source of apprehension for Beijing, fearing a potential blockage should bilateral relations erode.

G7 responses to maritime security challenges

A rich tapestry of bilateral, minilateral and multilateral partnerships are in place to promote regional maritime security and ensure freedom of navigation along the Indo-Pacific chokepoints, bringing together regional as well as international actors, including G7 countries.

Traditional security in the maritime domain

G7 leaders have formally integrated the security architecture of the Indo-Pacific into the group's agenda (G7 2024),^{xx} pointing to the Chinese attempt to claim sovereignty over disputed waters in the South and East China Seas while emphasising the need to uphold the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) (G7 2024).^{xxi} The G7 has reiterated its support for the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) as a main mechanism for governance in the SCS. They have promoted cooperation in line with ASEAN's Outlook on the Indo-Pacific, which emphasises the resolution of maritime disputes as a main area of cooperation (ASEAN n.d.).^{xxii} G7 individual countries increasingly engage in port calls and joint exercises with regional partners, in a dual attempt to build trust and project military power amidst growing alarm over China's territorial ambitions (Julienne and Pajon 2024).^{xxiii}

The US remains to this day the main security player of the region. It has multiple treaty allies – Australia, Japan, New Zealand, the Philippines, South Korea – and enjoys a unique relationship with Taiwan. The US Navy conducts “Freedom of Navigation Operations” (FONOPs) in the Taiwan Straits and the South China Sea, and either conducts or is part of a number of multinational military exercises, such as the Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC) in and around Hawaii (US Department of Defense n.d.),^{xxiv} Malabar in India's waters (US Embassy & Consulates in India 2024)^{xxv} and Pitch Black off northern Australia's coasts (US Embassy & Consulates in India 2024).^{xxvi}

France and the UK also play a role in the architecture of the regional maritime domain, though to a (much) lesser extent. The UK engages in military cooperation with the Five Power Defence Arrangements with commonwealth members - Australia, Malaysia, New Zealand and Singapore (HM Government 2023).^{xxvii} In 2021, the UK government sealed the Trilateral Security Partnership with Australia and the United States (AUKUS) to support the Royal Australian Navy in acquiring nuclear-powered submarines and enhance joint capabilities and interoperability with partners (US Department of Defense n.d.).^{xxviii} The AUKUS agreement prompted the French government to restructure its role as a security guarantor over its overseas territories, with over 1.6 million French citizens and nearly 90% of France's exclusive economic zone (EEZ)¹ located in the region (Pajon 2024).^{xxix} Paris has regularly sent ships to the South and East China Seas. The latest of such missions, led by the *Bretagne* frigate in 2024, made port calls in India, Indonesia, the Philippines, Guam, Hawaii and Japan, in an attempt to build trust with local navies with the view of achieving future interoperability (Julienne and Pajon 2024).^{xxx}

In 2019 Japan's Self-Defence Forces conducted their first Indo-Pacific deployment with the flagship *JS Izumo*, with port calls to Brunei, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Vietnam (Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force n.d.).^{xxxi} Since then, the Japanese navy has engaged in a number of bilateral and multilateral naval drills with US, Australian, Indian, French and

¹ the second largest in the world just behind the US.

Southeast Asian navies (*ibid*).^{xxxii} Furthermore, the two G7 countries Japan and the United States have established the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad), together with India and Australia. The Quad has shown a considerable degree of alignment on maritime security challenges, mostly identified as China's threatening behaviour in the SCS. The Quad has intensified efforts to set up mechanisms for maritime cooperation, such as its Indo-Pacific Partnership for Maritime Domain Awareness (IPMDA), a framework to enhance regional capacity in maritime security by implementing surveillance and security innovation (Australian Government n.d.).^{xxxiii}

The remaining G7 countries have a much more modest, albeit growing, military presence in the Indo-Pacific. In September 2024, two German Navy ships – the frigate *Baden-Wuerttemberg* and the replenishment oiler *Frankfurt am Main* - crossed the Taiwan Strait (the first time since 2002 for a German warship) (Luk 2024).^{xxxiv} Following China's war games around Taiwan in October 2024, Canada deployed its frigate *HMCS Vancouver* in the Strait, next to the US Navy's 7th Fleet (VOA News 2024).^{xxxv} Italy launched its "Indo-Pacific Campaign" in 2023; the offshore patrol vessel *Morosini* made port calls in India, South Korea and Japan among others (Insisa et al. 2024).^{xxxvi} A second, more ambitious campaign followed the next year, with Italy's flagship, the aircraft carrier *Cavour*, travelling across the Indo-Pacific, with port calls to the British military base in Diego Garcia, Guam, Japan, the Philippines, Singapore and Pakistan among others. The Italian navy also participated in the US-led military exercise RIMPAC, as well as in the Australian-led Pitch Black (Italian Ministry of Defense 2024).^{xxxvii} In January 2025, the frigate *Marceglia* sailed towards the Indo-Pacific area under the Italian-French FREMM (European Multi-Mission Frigates) project (Italian Ministry of Defense n.d).^{xxxviii}

Economic security and connectivity in the maritime domain

The G7 introduced supply chain resilience as a priority into its agenda in 2022, under the German presidency. G7 leaders launched the Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment (PGII), a platform to catalyse infrastructural investments in the Indo-Pacific region. Through this partnership, the G7 aims to invest and mobilize up to US\$600 billion by 2027 to narrow the infrastructure investment gap in partner countries. "Supply chain resilience [and] connectivity through digital infrastructure and transport networks" is a core objective of the initiative (G7 Italy 2024).^{xxxix}

Under Italy's presidency, the G7 Trade Ministers meeting devoted "special attention" to the crisis in the Red Sea and its impact on supply chains and connectivity (Presidency of the Council of Ministers 2024).^{xl} The debate focussed on how maritime security would impact trade routes and have economic implications for Mediterranean ports and supply chains (*ibid*).^{xli} At the time the G7 countries were already deeply involved in attempts to bolster the security of the SLOCs threatened by the Houthis. In December 2023, the United States had launched the multinational security initiative Operation Prosperity Guardian to patrol the SLOC between the Suez Canal, the Red Sea, the Bab-el-Mandeb strait and the Gulf of Aden (US Department of Defence 2023).^{xlii} The EU followed suit a few months later, with the

EUNAVFOR Aspides - purely defensive - maritime security operation (European Council 2025).^{xliii}

In April 2024, leaders of the United States, the Philippines and Japan announced the intent to develop the Luzon Economic Corridor under the G7 PGII, the first in the Indo-Pacific region (US Department of Defense 2024).^{xliv} The project involves a US\$174 million expansion of the Filipino Clark International Airport and a US\$3.2 billion Subic-Clark-Manila-Batangas railway, which will span 250 kilometres, with construction expected to start in 2027 (Pamir 2024).^{xlv} It is designed to be paired with tax incentives to attract foreign (US and the other G7 countries) capitals for semiconductor and EV battery manufacturing companies to reshore in the region and have closer access to the Philippines' abundant mineral resources.²

Investments are indeed much needed to secure regional connectivity. Under Japan's presidency in 2023, the G7 announced a plan for building a network of undersea communication cables to serve developing and emerging countries – including trans-oceanic routes in the Pacific region (Hirosawa and Yasoshima 2023).^{xlvi} As several European countries, especially in the Baltic region, have been targeted by a series of attacks to ICT cables, European G7 countries have become increasingly aware of the need to establish security mechanisms to respond to "grey zone" aggressions involving infrastructure sabotage, cyberattacks and disinformation campaigns (Küstners et al. 2024).^{xlvii} Such a commitment was flagged under the Italian presidency, although it has yet to materialise (MIMIT 2024).^{xlviii} Under the G7 umbrella, governments (with the exception of Germany) joined the UN's "New York Joint Statement on the Security and Resilience of Undersea Cables in a Globally Digitalized World", with the other endorsing countries including Australia, New Zealand and South Korea, among others³ (European Commission 2024).^{xlix}

Regional agreements for cable maintenance already exist, such as the South East Asia and Indian Ocean Cable Maintenance Agreement (SEAIOCMA), and the Quad Partnership for Cable Connectivity and Resilience, aiming to improve technical knowledge-sharing on cable maintenance between states (Tomaz and Voo 2024).¹ Despite regional efforts, investment in cable maintenance lags behind the booming demand for cable systems and is insufficient to address the frequency of cable disruptions (*ibid*).^{li} For the moment, the joint effort between the UN and the G7 does not offer tangible measures to strengthen cable maintenance nor a regional focus on the Indo-Pacific. However, it remains a promising first step. Overall, the interconnection of the Indo-Pacific with other global theatres and the nature of supply chains and connectivity - unfolding on a global scale - call for a coordinated approach, to provide an international response to regional challenges.

² nickel, cobalt, copper and bauxite.

³ Other endorsers: the Marshall Islands, Singapore, Tonga, Tuvalu.

Recommendations

- Amidst a changing global order, the G7 should secure its cooperation role in the Indo-Pacific region. To maximize its effort and reduce redundancy with existing regional initiatives, the G7 should establish a multilateral Maritime Security Dialogue (MSD) for the Indo-Pacific. The MSD should build on the strategic role of Japan in the region, to bring together G7 members and like-minded countries pivotal to the region's security architecture, most notably Australia, New Zealand, South Korea and India and (IP3 + India).
- The MSD should extend existing G7 working groups (WG) to the IP3+India covering the most pressing security and economic challenges of the region, such as:
 - a. Supply chain resilience
In 2023 Japan's presidency prioritized the Indo-Pacific, economic security, and supply chain resilience, while in 2024 Italy's agenda pivoted to its more direct neighbourhood of North Africa. A WG on resilient supply chains should ensure a more consistent, consensus-based agenda for a sustained attention to this strategic geographical region and strategic sector. The G7 should entrench its effort to existing minilateral frameworks, such as the Supply Chain Resilience Initiative (SCRI) between India, Japan and Australia.
 - b. Maritime domain awareness (MDA)
MDA underpins a free, open and secure Indo-Pacific. Within the MSD framework, the G7 should engage in consultations with the IP3+India, as well as with the Quad. Exchanging best practices with existing initiatives such as the Quad's IPMDA, a WG on maritime domain awareness should enhance preparedness to maritime security threats; enhance information-sharing between partners; and work towards interoperability through regional pilot projects. MDA should include a WG to promote submarine ICT cables, to promote monitoring and early warning mechanisms, and exchange best practices to increase incident-responses to potential disruptions.
 - c. Protection of maritime routes and SLOCs
This WG should serve as a framework to catalyse existing initiatives to protect maritime routes, such as anti-piracy patrol missions, response to cyber-attacks, response to environmental crises disrupting SLOCs. As such, the G7's outreach should include existing frameworks such as the Gulf Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf, ASEAN, and East African countries.
- Under the Maritime Security Dialogue for the Indo-Pacific, G7 countries should engage in greater military cooperation at the bilateral or minilateral level, aligning the G7's security effort in these waterways, while achieving greater coordination among the main actors safeguarding maritime security in the region.

Author Biographies

Francesca Maremonti is Research Fellow for Asia within the Global Actors Programme at the Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI) in Rome. Her research work covers the foreign policy of the People's Republic of China, digital governance and economic security.

Dr. Riccardo Alcaro is Research Coordinator and Head of the Global Actors Programme at the Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI) in Rome. His main area of expertise are transatlantic relations, with a special focus on US and European policies in Europe's surrounding regions.

Dr. Aurelio Insisa is Senior Research Fellow for Asia within the Global Actors Programme at the Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI) In Rome. His research focuses on the PRC's foreign policy, cross-Strait relations, and EU-Asia relations.

Works Cited

- ⁱ US Department of State. 2022. *The Indo-Pacific Strategy*. US Department of State. <https://www.state.gov/indo-pacific-strategy/>
- ⁱⁱ Abbondanza Gabriele and Wilkins Thomas. 2024. "Europe in the Indo-Pacific: Economic, security, and normative engagement." *International Political Science Review*, Vol. 45(5) 640–646. <https://doi.org/10.1177/01925121231202694>
- ⁱⁱⁱ The Government of Japan. 2016. *Achieving the "Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP)" Vision*. The Government of Japan. <https://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/other/bluebook/2020/html/feature/f0104.html>
- ^{iv} HM Government. 2023. *Integrated Review Refresh 2023 Responding to a more contested and volatile world*. HM Government. https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/641d72f45155a2000c6ad5d5/11857435_NS_IR_Refresh_2023_Supply_AllPages_Revision_7_WEB_PDF.pdf
- ^v European Union External Action. 2024. *EU Indo-Pacific Strategy*. https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eu-indo-pacific-strategy-topic_en
- ^{vi} Government of Canada. *Canada's Indo-Pacific Strategy – 2022 to 2023 Implementation Update*. <https://www.international.gc.ca/transparency-transparence/indo-pacific-indo-pacifique/2022-2023.aspx?lang=eng>
- ^{vii} Goretti Leo e Simonelli Filippo. 2024. "Mediterraneo allargato: dalle primavere arabe al Piano Mattei". *Affari Internazionali*. Agosto. <https://www.affarinternazionali.it/mediterraneo-allargato-dalle-primavere-arabe-al-piano-mattei/>
- ^{viii} Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation. 2025. *Joint G7 Foreign Ministers' Statement – Meeting of G7 Foreign Ministers on the margins of the Munich Security Conference*. Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation https://www.esteri.it/en/sala_stampa/archivionotizie/comunicati/2025/02/dichiarazione-congiunta-dei-ministri-degli-esteri-del-g7-riunione-dei-ministri-degli-esteri-del-g7-alla-conferenza-sulla-sicurezza-di-monaco/
- ^{ix} Riyaz ul Khali. 2024. "Militaries of China, Russia conduct joint aerial patrol, S.Korea scrambles jets". *Anadolu Ajansı*. November. <https://www.aa.com.tr/en/asia-pacific/militaries-of-china-russia-conduct-joint-aerial-patrol-skorea-scrambles-jets/3408067>
- ^x Martina Michael and Brunnstrom David. 2024. "Exclusive: China harbors ship tied to North Korea-Russia arms transfers, satellite images show." *Reuters*. April. <https://www.reuters.com/world/china-harbors-ship-tied-north-korea-russia-arms-transfers-satellite-images-show-2024-04-25/>
- ^{xi} King Mallory. 2021. "North Korean Sanctions: Evasion Techniques". RAND
- ^{xii} Tomer Fadlon and Raz Zimmt. 2024. "Growing but Limited: Iranian Economic Relations with China," *INSS Insight* 1890
- ^{xiii} Panda Jagannath. 2023. "Indo-Pacific Security in 2030-35: Links in the Chain." *Institute for Security and Development Policy*. October. <https://www.isdp.eu/publication/indo-pacific-security-in-2030-35-links-in-the-chain/>
- ^{xiv} Statista. 2024. *Semiconductor industry in the Asia-Pacific region - statistics & facts*. Statista. <https://www.statista.com/topics/11501/semiconductor-industry-in-the-asia-pacific-region/#topicOverview>
- ^{xv} Statista. 2024. *Electric Vehicles - Thailand*. Statista. <https://www.statista.com/outlook/mmo/electric-vehicles/thailand>
- ^{xvi} Bellabarba Giuliana. 2024. "The Coastal States Tackling Piracy in the Malacca Strait". *Security Outlines*. February. <https://www.securityoutlines.cz/the-coastal-states-tackling-piracy-in-the-malacca-strait/>
- ^{xvii} Tomaz Priscilla and Voo Julia. 2024. "Submarine cables: the Achilles' heel of cyberspace in the Asia-Pacific". *IISS*. October.

<https://www.iiss.org/cyber-power-matrix/submarine-cables-the-achilles-heel-of-cyberspace-in-the-asia-pacific/>

^{xxviii} Panda Jagannath 2023. "Indo-Pacific Security in 2030-35: Links in the Chain." Hague Centre for Strategic Studies, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep53658>

^{xix} Wyatt Weekes. 2023. "Goeconomic Crossroads. The Strait of Malacca's Impact on Regional Trade". The National Bureau of Asian Research. <https://www.nbr.org/publication/geoeconomic-crossroads-the-strait-of-malaccas-impact-on-regional-trade/>

^{xx} G7. 2024. *Apulia G7 Leaders' Communiqué*. G7. <https://www.g7italy.it/wp-content/uploads/Apulia-G7-Leaders-Communique.pdf>

^{xxi} G7. 2024. *Apulia G7 Leaders' Communiqué*. G7. <https://www.g7italy.it/wp-content/uploads/Apulia-G7-Leaders-Communique.pdf>

^{xxii} ASEAN. *ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific*. ASEAN. https://asean.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/ASEAN-Outlook-on-the-Indo-Pacific_FINAL_22062019.pdf

^{xxiii} Julienne Marc and Pajon Céline. 2024. "Deployment of the French Frigate Bretagne in the Indo-Pacific Implementing French Strategy in the Region". Ifri Memos Center for Asian Studies. September. https://www.ifri.org/sites/default/files/2024-09/ifri_julienne_pajon_fremm_bretagne_indopacific_2024.pdf

^{xxiv} US Department of Defense. *Rim of the Pacific*. US Department of Defense. <https://www.defense.gov/spotlights/rim-of-the-pacific/>

^{xxv} US Embassy & Consulates in India. 2024. *India hosts Australia, Japan and U.S. forces in Exercise Malabar 2024*. <https://in.usembassy.gov/india-hosts-australia-japan-and-u-s-forces-in-exercise-malabar-2024/#:~:text=VISAKHAPATNAM%2C%20INDIA%20%E2%80%93%20Australia%2C%20Japan,Vishakhapatnam%2C%20India%2C%20on%20Oct>

^{xxvi} Royal Australian Air Force. 2024. *Exercise Pitch Black 2024*. <https://www.airforce.gov.au/news-events/events/exercise-pitch-black-2024>

^{xxvii} HM Government. 2023. *Integrated Review Refresh 2023 Responding to a more contested and volatile world*. HM Government. https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/641d72f45155a2000c6ad5d5/11857435_NS_IR_Refresh_2023_Supply_AllPages_Revision_7_WEB_PDF.pdf

^{xxviii} US Department of Defense. *AUKUS: The Trilateral Security Partnership Between Australia, U.K. and U.S.* US Department of Defense. <https://www.defense.gov/Spotlights/AUKUS/>

^{xxix} Pajon Céline. 2024. "La stratégie indopacifique de la France". Vie Publique. June. <https://www.vie-publique.fr/parole-dexpert/294622-la-strategie-indopacifique-de-la-france-par-celine-pajon>

^{xxx} Julienne Marc and Pajon Céline. 2024. "Deployment of the French Frigate Bretagne in the Indo-Pacific Implementing French Strategy in the Region". Ifri Memos Center for Asian Studies. September. https://www.ifri.org/sites/default/files/2024-09/ifri_julienne_pajon_fremm_bretagne_indopacific_2024.pdf

^{xxxi} Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force. *Indo-Pacific Deployment 2019(IPD19)*. Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force. <https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/JIPA/Display/Article/2870659/confluence-of-a-free-and-open-indo-pacific-how-japans-strengths-can-shore-up-am/#sdendnote10sym>

^{xxxii} Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force. *Indo-Pacific Deployment 2019(IPD19)*. Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force. <https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/JIPA/Display/Article/2870659/confluence-of-a-free-and-open-indo-pacific-how-japans-strengths-can-shore-up-am/#sdendnote10sym>

^{xxxiii} Australian Government Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet. *Indo-Pacific Partnership for Maritime Domain Awareness*. <https://www.pmc.gov.au/resources/quad-leaders-summit-2023/indo-pacific-partnership-maritime-domain-awareness>

^{xxxiv} Luck Alex. 2024. VOA News. 2024 "German Navy Ships Transit Taiwan Strait, Draw Chinese Criticism". Naval News. September. <https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2024/09/german-navy-transits-taiwan-strait/>

-
- ^{xxxv}VOA News. 2024. "US, Canadian navy ships sail through Taiwan Strait week after China war games." VOA News. October. <https://www.voanews.com/a/us-canadian-navy-ships-sail-through-taiwan-strait-week-after-china-war-games/7829524.html>
- ^{xxxvi} Insisa Aurelio, Menotti Roberto, Frigeri Daniele, Sergio Lugaresi, Rizzi Alberto, Varvelli Arturo, Goretti Leo, Simonelli Filippo, Fasulo Filippo, Missaglia Nicola. 2024. "India e paesi ASEAN nei nuovi allineamenti geopolitici nell'Indo-Pacifico: le opzioni per l'Italia". Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation. <https://www.esteri.it/wp-content/uploads/2024/12/india-e-paesi-asean-comunita-polestera-25.11.pdf>
- ^{xxxvii} Italian Ministry of Defense. 2024. *Conclusa la 29a edizione della RIMPAC 2024: prima partecipazione di una nave della Marina Militare Italiana*. https://www.marina.difesa.it/media-cultura/Notiziario-online/Pagine/20240801_conclusione_rimpac.aspx
- ^{xxxviii} Italian Ministry of Defense. *Campaign across the Indo-Pacific, ITS Marceglia heading to the Orient*. Ministry of Defense https://www.marina.difesa.it/EN/Conosciamoci/notizie/Pagine/20250205_Campaign%20across%20the%20Indo-Pacific%20ITS%20Marceglia%20heading%20to%20the%20Orient.aspx#:~:text=6%20February%202025%2011.10&text=%E2%80%8B%E2%80%8B%E2%80%8BFrigate%20Antonio,in%20the%20Indo%2DPacific%20area
- ^{xxxix} G7 Italy. 2024. *Factsheet on the G7 Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment (PGII)*. G7 Italy. <https://www.g7italy.it/wp-content/uploads/ANNEX-I-G7-PGII-Factsheet-2024.pdf>
- ^{xi} Presidency of the Council of Ministers. 2024. *Trade Ministers meeting. Presidency of the Council of Ministers*. <https://www.g7italy.it/en/trade-ministers-meeting/>
- ^{xii} Presidency of the Council of Ministers. 2024. *Trade Ministers meeting. Presidency of the Council of Ministers*. <https://www.g7italy.it/en/trade-ministers-meeting/>
- ^{xiii} US Department of Defence. 2023. *Statement from Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III on Ensuring Freedom of Navigation in the Red Sea*. <https://www.defense.gov/News/Releases/Release/Article/3621110/statement-from-secretary-of-defense-lloyd-j-austin-iii-on-ensuring-freedom-of-n/>
- ^{xiii} European Council. 2025. *Red Sea: Council prolongs the mandate of Operation ASPIDE*. <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2025/02/14/red-sea-council-prolongs-the-mandate-of-operation-aspides/>
- ^{xiv} US Department of Defense - Office of the Spokesperson. 2024. *The United States, the Philippines, and Japan Launch the Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment Luzon Economic Corridor*. US Department of Defense. April. <https://2021-2025.state.gov/the-united-states-the-philippines-and-japan-launch-the-partnership-for-global-infrastructure-and-investment-luzon-economic-corridor/>
- ^{xiv} Pamir. 2024. "US, Japan and the Philippines launch Luzon Economic Corridor to attract G7 countries and expand economic influence in Southeast Asia". Pamir. <https://pamirllc.com/blog/us-japan-and-the-philippines-launch-luzon-economic-corridor-attract-g7-countries>
- ^{xvi} Hirose Mayumi and Yasoshima Ryohei. 2023. "G-7 to support deep-sea cable network for emerging nations". Nikkei Asia. April. <https://asia.nikkei.com/Business/Telecommunication/G-7-to-support-deep-sea-cable-network-for-emerging-nations>
- ^{xvii} Küsters Anselm, Wolf André and Poli Eleonora. 2024. "Challenges to Transatlantic Digital Infrastructure: An EU Perspective". IAI Papers. <https://www.iai.it/sites/default/files/iaip2403.pdf>
- ^{xviii} MIMIT. 2024. Annex 1 Joint Statement on Cable Connectivity for Secure and Resilient Digital Communications Networks. MIMIT. https://www.mimit.gov.it/images/stories/digitale/G7_2024/202403_G7-Industry-Tech-and-Digital-Ministerial-Declaration-Annexes_2.pdf
- ^{xix} European Commission 2024. *New York Joint Statement on the Security and Resilience of Undersea Cables in a Globally Digitalized World*. European Commission. <https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/library/new-york-joint-statement-security-and-resilience-undersea-cables-globally-digitalized-world>

-
- ^l Tomaz Priscilla and Voo Julia. 2024. "Submarine cables: the Achilles' heel of cyberspace in the Asia-Pacific". IISS. October. <https://www.iiss.org/cyber-power-matrix/submarine-cables-the-achilles-heel-of-cyberspace-in-the-asia-pacific/>
- ^{li} Tomaz Priscilla and Voo Julia. 2024. "Submarine cables: the Achilles' heel of cyberspace in the Asia-Pacific". IISS. October. <https://www.iiss.org/cyber-power-matrix/submarine-cables-the-achilles-heel-of-cyberspace-in-the-asia-pacific/>
- Defense Intelligence Agency. 2024. *Yemen: Houthi Attacks Placing Pressure on International Trade*. Defense Intelligence Agency. https://www.dia.mil/Portals/110/Images/News/Military_Powers_Publications/YEM_Houthi-Attacks-Pressuring-International-Trade.pdf
- ^{li} US Department of State. 2022. *The Indo-Pacific Strategy*. US Department of State. <https://www.state.gov/indo-pacific-strategy/>
- ^{li} Abbondanza Gabriele and Wilkins Thomas. 2024. "Europe in the Indo-Pacific: Economic, security, and normative engagement." *International Political Science Review*, Vol. 45(5) 640–646. <https://doi.org/10.1177/01925121231202694>
- ^{li} The Government of Japan. 2016. *Achieving the "Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP)" Vision*. The Government of Japan. <https://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/other/bluebook/2020/html/feature/f0104.html>
- ^{li} HM Government. 2023. *Integrated Review Refresh 2023 Responding to a more contested and volatile world*. HM Government. https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/641d72f45155a2000c6ad5d5/11857435_NS_IR_Refresh_2023_Supply_AllPages_Revision_7_WEB_PDF.pdf
- ^{li} European Union External Action. 2024. *EU Indo-Pacific Strategy*. https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eu-indo-pacific-strategy-topic_en
- ^{li} Government of Canada. *Canada's Indo-Pacific Strategy – 2022 to 2023 Implementation Update*. <https://www.international.gc.ca/transparence-transparence/indo-pacific-indo-pacifique/2022-2023.aspx?lang=eng>
- ^{li} Goretti Leo e Simonelli Filippo. 2024. "Mediterraneo allargato: dalle primavere arabe al Piano Mattei". *Affari Internazionali*. Agosto. <https://www.affarinternazionali.it/mediterraneo-allargato-dalle-primavere-arabe-al-piano-mattei/>
- ^{li} Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation. 2025. *Joint G7 Foreign Ministers' Statement – Meeting of G7 Foreign Ministers on the margins of the Munich Security Conference*. Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation https://www.esteri.it/en/sala_stampa/archivionotizie/comunicati/2025/02/dichiarazione-congiunta-dei-ministri-degli-esteri-del-g7-riunione-dei-ministri-degli-esteri-del-g7-alla-conferenza-sulla-sicurezza-di-monaco/
- ^{li} Riyaz ul Khali. 2024. "Militaries of China, Russia conduct joint aerial patrol, S.Korea scrambles jets". *Anadolu Ajansı*. November. <https://www.aa.com.tr/en/asia-pacific/militaries-of-china-russia-conduct-joint-aerial-patrol-skorea-scrambles-jets/3408067>
- ^{li} Martina Michael and Brunnstrom David. 2024. "Exclusive: China harbors ship tied to North Korea-Russia arms transfers, satellite images show." *Reuters*. April. <https://www.reuters.com/world/china-harbors-ship-tied-north-korea-russia-arms-transfers-satellite-images-show-2024-04-25/>
- ^{li} King Mallory. 2021. "North Korean Sanctions: Evasion Techniques". RAND
- ^{li} Tomer Fadlon and Raz Zimmt. 2024. "Growing but Limited: Iranian Economic Relations with China," *INSS Insight* 1890
- ^{li} Panda Jagannath. 2023. "Indo-Pacific Security in 2030-35: Links in the Chain." *Institute for Security and Development Policy*. October. <https://www.isdp.eu/publication/indo-pacific-security-in-2030-35-links-in-the-chain/>
- ^{li} Statista. 2024. *Semiconductor industry in the Asia-Pacific region - statistics & facts*. Statista. <https://www.statista.com/topics/11501/semiconductor-industry-in-the-asia-pacific-region/#topicOverview>
- ^{li} Statista. 2024. *Electric Vehicles - Thailand*. Statista. <https://www.statista.com/outlook/mmo/electric-vehicles/thailand>

-
- ^{li} Bellabarba Giuliana. 2024. "The Coastal States Tackling Piracy in the Malacca Strait". Security Outlines. February. <https://www.securityoutlines.cz/the-coastal-states-tackling-piracy-in-the-malacca-strait/>
- ^{li} Tomaz Priscilla and Voo Julia. 2024. "Submarine cables: the Achilles' heel of cyberspace in the Asia-Pacific". IISS. October. <https://www.iiss.org/cyber-power-matrix/submarine-cables-the-achilles-heel-of-cyberspace-in-the-asia-pacific/>
- ^{li} Panda Jagannath 2023. "Indo-Pacific Security in 2030-35: Links in the Chain." Hague Centre for Strategic Studies, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep53658>
- ^{li} Wyatt Weekes. 2023. "Goeconomic Crossroads. The Strait of Malacca's Impact on Regional Trade". The National Bureau of Asian Research. <https://www.nbr.org/publication/geoeconomic-crossroads-the-strait-of-malaccas-impact-on-regional-trade/>
- ^{li} G7. 2024. *Apulia G7 Leaders' Communiqué*. G7. <https://www.g7italy.it/wp-content/uploads/Apulia-G7-Leaders-Communique.pdf>
- ^{li} G7. 2024. *Apulia G7 Leaders' Communiqué*. G7. <https://www.g7italy.it/wp-content/uploads/Apulia-G7-Leaders-Communique.pdf>
- ^{li} ASEAN. *ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific*. ASEAN. https://asean.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/ASEAN-Outlook-on-the-Indo-Pacific_FINAL_22062019.pdf
- ^{li} Julienne Marc and Pajon Céline. 2024. "Deployment of the French Frigate Bretagne in the Indo-Pacific Implementing French Strategy in the Region". Ifri Memos Center for Asian Studies. September. https://www.ifri.org/sites/default/files/2024-09/ifri_julienne_pajon_fremm_bretagne_indopacific_2024.pdf
- ^{li} US Department of Defense. *Rim of the Pacific*. US Department of Defense. <https://www.defense.gov/spotlights/rim-of-the-pacific/>
- ^{li} US Embassy & Consulates in India. 2024. *India hosts Australia, Japan and U.S. forces in Exercise Malabar 2024*. <https://in.usembassy.gov/india-hosts-australia-japan-and-u-s-forces-in-exercise-malabar-2024/#:~:text=VISAKHAPATNAM%2C%20INDIA%20%E2%80%93%20Australia%2C%20Japan,Vishakhapatnam%2C%20India%2C%20on%20Oct>
- ^{li} Royal Australian Air Force. 2024. *Exercise Pitch Black 2024*. <https://www.airforce.gov.au/news-events/events/exercise-pitch-black-2024>
- ^{li} HM Government. 2023. *Integrated Review Refresh 2023 Responding to a more contested and volatile world*. HM Government. https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/641d72f45155a2000c6ad5d5/11857435_NS_IR_Refresh_2023_Supply_AllPages_Revision_7_WEB_PDF.pdf
- ^{li} US Department of Defense. *AUKUS: The Trilateral Security Partnership Between Australia, U.K. and U.S.* US Department of Defense. <https://www.defense.gov/Spotlights/AUKUS/>
- ^{li} Pajon Céline. 2024. "La stratégie indopacifique de la France". Vie Publique. June. <https://www.vie-publique.fr/parole-dexpert/294622-la-strategie-indopacifique-de-la-france-par-celine-pajon>
- ^{li} Julienne Marc and Pajon Céline. 2024. "Deployment of the French Frigate Bretagne in the Indo-Pacific Implementing French Strategy in the Region". Ifri Memos Center for Asian Studies. September. https://www.ifri.org/sites/default/files/2024-09/ifri_julienne_pajon_fremm_bretagne_indopacific_2024.pdf
- ^{li} Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force. *Indo-Pacific Deployment 2019(IPD19)*. Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force. <https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/JIPA/Display/Article/2870659/confluence-of-a-free-and-open-indo-pacific-how-japans-strengths-can-shore-up-am/#sdendnote10sym>
- ^{li} Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force. *Indo-Pacific Deployment 2019(IPD19)*. Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force. <https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/JIPA/Display/Article/2870659/confluence-of-a-free-and-open-indo-pacific-how-japans-strengths-can-shore-up-am/#sdendnote10sym>

-
- ^{li} Australian Government Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet. *Indo-Pacific Partnership for Maritime Domain Awareness*. <https://www.pmc.gov.au/resources/quad-leaders-summit-2023/indo-pacific-partnership-maritime-domain-awareness>
- ^{li} Luck Alex. 2024. VOA News. 2024 "German Navy Ships Transit Taiwan Strait, Draw Chinese Criticism". Naval News. September. <https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2024/09/german-navy-transits-taiwan-strait/>
- ^{li} VOA News. 2024. "US, Canadian navy ships sail through Taiwan Strait week after China war games." VOA News. October. <https://www.voanews.com/a/us-canadian-navy-ships-sail-through-taiwan-strait-week-after-china-war-games/7829524.html>
- ^{li} Insisa Aurelio, Menotti Roberto, Frigeri Daniele, Sergio Lugaresi, Rizzi Alberto, Varvelli Arturo, Goretti Leo, Simonelli Filippo, Fasulo Filippo, Missaglia Nicola. 2024. "India e paesi ASEAN nei nuovi allineamenti geopolitici nell'Indo-Pacifico: le opzioni per l'Italia". Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation. <https://www.esteri.it/wp-content/uploads/2024/12/india-e-paesi-asean-comunita-polestera-25.11.pdf>
- ^{li} Italian Ministry of Defense. 2024. *Conclusa la 29a edizione della RIMPAC 2024: prima partecipazione di una nave della Marina Militare Italiana*. https://www.marina.difesa.it/media-cultura/Notiziario-online/Pagine/20240801_conclusione_rimpac.aspx
- ^{li} Italian Ministry of Defense. *Campaign across the Indo-Pacific, ITS Marceglia heading to the Orient*. Ministry of Defense https://www.marina.difesa.it/EN/Conosciamoci/notizie/Pagine/20250205_Campaign%20across%20the%20Indo-Pacific.%20ITS%20Marceglia%20heading%20to%20the%20Orient.aspx#:~:text=6%20February%202025%2011.10&text=%E2%80%8B%E2%80%8B%E2%80%8BFrigate%20Antonio,in%20the%20Indo%2DPacific%20area
- ^{li} G7 Italy. 2024. *Factsheet on the G7 Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment (PGII)*. G7 Italy. <https://www.g7italy.it/wp-content/uploads/ANNEX-I-G7-PGII-Factsheet-2024.pdf>
- ^{li} Presidency of the Council of Ministers. 2024. *Trade Ministers meeting, Presidency of the Council of Ministers*. <https://www.g7italy.it/en/trade-ministers-meeting/>
- ^{li} Presidency of the Council of Ministers. 2024. *Trade Ministers meeting, Presidency of the Council of Ministers*. <https://www.g7italy.it/en/trade-ministers-meeting/>
- ^{li} US Department of Defence. 2023. *Statement from Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III on Ensuring Freedom of Navigation in the Red Sea*. <https://www.defense.gov/News/Releases/Release/Article/3621110/statement-from-secretary-of-defense-lloyd-j-austin-iii-on-ensuring-freedom-of-n/>
- ^{li} European Council. 2025. *Red Sea: Council prolongs the mandate of Operation ASPIDE*. <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2025/02/14/red-sea-council-prolongs-the-mandate-of-operation-aspides/>
- ^{li} US Department of Defense - Office of the Spokesperson. 2024. *The United States, the Philippines, and Japan Launch the Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment Luzon Economic Corridor*. US Department of Defense. April. <https://2021-2025.state.gov/the-united-states-the-philippines-and-japan-launch-the-partnership-for-global-infrastructure-and-investment-luzon-economic-corridor/>
- ^{li} Pamir. 2024. "US, Japan and the Philippines launch Luzon Economic Corridor to attract G7 countries and expand economic influence in Southeast Asia". Pamir. <https://pamirlc.com/blog/us-japan-and-the-philippines-launch-luzon-economic-corridor-attract-g7-countries>
- ^{li} Hirosawa Mayumi and Yasoshima Ryohei. 2023. "G-7 to support deep-sea cable network for emerging nations". Nikkei Asia. April. <https://asia.nikkei.com/Business/Telecommunication/G-7-to-support-deep-sea-cable-network-for-emerging-nations>
- ^{li} Küsters Anselm, Wolf André and Poli Eleonora. 2024. "Challenges to Transatlantic Digital Infrastructure: An EU Perspective". IAI Papers. <https://www.iai.it/sites/default/files/iaip2403.pdf>
- ^{li} MIMIT. 2024. Annex 1 Joint Statement on Cable Connectivity for Secure and Resilient Digital Communications Networks. MIMIT. https://www.mimit.gov.it/images/stories/digitale/G7_2024/202403_G7-Industry-Tech-and-Digital-Ministerial-Declaration-Annexes_2.pdf

^{li} European Commission 2024. *New York Joint Statement on the Security and Resilience of Undersea Cables in a Globally Digitalized World*. European Commission. <https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/library/new-york-joint-statement-security-and-resilience-undersea-cables-globally-digitalized-world>

^{li} Tomaz Priscilla and Voo Julia. 2024. "Submarine cables: the Achilles' heel of cyberspace in the Asia-Pacific". IISS. October. <https://www.iiss.org/cyber-power-matrix/submarine-cables-the-achilles-heel-of-cyberspace-in-the-asia-pacific/>

^{li} Tomaz Priscilla and Voo Julia. 2024. "Submarine cables: the Achilles' heel of cyberspace in the Asia-Pacific". IISS. October. <https://www.iiss.org/cyber-power-matrix/submarine-cables-the-achilles-heel-of-cyberspace-in-the-asia-pacific/>